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cial decisions in line with clearly-stated legislative policy and obviate a resort
to such extreme measures as the court in the instant case felt compelled to
adopt.

Constitutional Law-Freedom of Speech-Requirement that Speeches and
Program Be Submitted as Condition Precedent to Use of Public Auditorium
Invalid-[California.-The petitioners, members of the San Diego Civil Liberties Comniittee, applied to the respondent school board for the use of a high
school auditorium for a series of meetings. The California Civic Center Act'
empowered the respondent board to require a copy of the program and speeches
to be filed in advance and to permit the use of the school facilities onlyin accordance with regulations adopted by the board. The petitioners refused to submit
a copy of their program and speeches. Thereupon the respondent agreed to grant
the petitioners use of the auditorium upon the sole condition that the petitioners
file an oath of non-affiliation with any organization seeking to overthrow the government by violence. The petitioners refused to comply and instituted mandamus proceedings in the California Supreme Court to compel the respondent board
to grant the use of the auditorium free from any conditions. Held, the writ of
mandamus should issue, two justices dissenting. Those sections of the California
Civic Center Act requiring copies of the program and speeches to be filed in
advance with the respondent board are an unconstitutional restriction upon
freedom of expression. Danskin v. San Diego Unified School District. 2
The vigorous dissent in this case questions the majority opinion's application
of the clear and present danger test, noting the limited degree to which that
test has been employed by courts in the past. An examination of the origin and
previous application of this judicial test seems to substantiate the minority
opinion. Few cases have directly considered the validity of a statute regulating
the conduct of meetings in public auditoriums. Davis v. Massacknsets3 was the
leading case on the closely related question of statutes governing public meetings in streets and parks. As a consequence of this decision, statutes regulating
freedom of expression by requiring a permit as a condition precedent to a public
meeting were upheld by the courts where arbitrary and unlimited discretionary
powers were not placed in the hands of the licensing official.4 The test employed
in determining the statute's validity in these cases was whether the restriction
constituted a proper and reasonable exercise of a state's police powers
I Cal. Education Code (Deering, '944) §§ 19431-39.
2 71 P. 2d 885 (Cal., 1946).
3 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
4 Bloomington v. Richardson, 38 Ill. App. 6o (1889); Commonwealth v. Abrahams, 156
Mass. 57,30 N.E. 79 (1892); Duquesne v. Fincke, 269 Pa. 112, 112 At. 130 (1920); Buffalo v.
Till, 182 N.Y. Supp. 418 (App. Div., 1920).
s See also Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Anderson v. Wellington, 40 Kan.
173, 19 P. 719 (1888); Chicago v. Trotter, 136 Ill. 430, 26 N.E. 359 (x89i); Fittsv. Atlanta,
121 Ga. 567, 49 S.E. 793 (1905); People ex rel. Doyle v. Atwell, 232 N.Y. 96, 133 N.E. 364
(1921);

Commonwealth v. Surridge, 265 Mass. 425, 164 N.E. 480 (I928); Coughlin v. Chicago

Park District, 364 Ill. 9o, 4 N.E. 2d i (1936).
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Recent cases, however, have indicated a more stringent attitude on the part
of the courts toward any statute restricting freedom of expression.6 This attitude has taken the form of restricting the scope of permissible state regulation
in this field by employing a different test, which provides that a clear and present danger to the community must arise from an exercise of free speech before
a statute may constitutionally prohibit or limit such expression. This doctrine
first emerged in the United States Supreme Court cases arising out of the Espionage Acts of I917 and i918,7 and, as subsequently developed, was applied to
cases involving criminal prosecutions both under penal statutes8 and at common
law.9 Actually, the application of a test based upon the imminence of a clear and
present danger to the nation, rather than upon a reasonable or rational relation
between the restriction imposed and the public welfare, ordinarily results in
striking down the statute because of the rare existence of such a danger.
It should be noted, moreover, that in each instance where the test of a clear
and present danger was employed by the United States Supreme Court, the
statute in question contemplated a prosecution involving a fine or imprisonment, or both, upon conviction.o The language found in more recent Supreme
Court cases has caused some authorities to believe that the clear and present
danger test is to be applied to all legislation purporting to restrict freedom of expression, irrespective of whether the legislation contains the elements of a penal
prosecution." If this suggestion has in fact become law it would appear to be a
substantial extension of this test as originally applied.
In Pennekamp v. Florida," the most recent Supreme Court case employing
the doctrine of a clear and present danger, the court indicated that the constitutionality of a restriction upon freedom of expression ultimately turns upon a
balancing of values by the court, rather than upon an imminent national dan6Lovell v. City of Griffin, 3o3 U.S. 444 (x938); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1940);
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (I943); Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 5r6 (1944); Pennekamp v. Florida, 66 S.Ct. 1029 (1946).
7Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Contra: Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616 (i919). Justice Holmes, who wrote the majority opinion in the Schenck case, dissented vigorously in the Abrams case, maintaining that the clear and present danger test was
improperly rejected.
8
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937);

Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.

252 (1941).
9 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (i94o); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1942).
10Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (ig91); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927);
Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (x937); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 3io U.S. 88 (194o); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (i94o); Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252 (194i); West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 3i9 U.S. 624
(i943); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (i944).

1See the cases and arguments collected in Murrish, Protection of Free Speech under the
Federal Constitution, 28 Calif. L. Rev. 733 (1940).
1266 S. Ct. 1029 (1946).
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ger in the sense that that phrase has been most frequently used. 3 For example,
in the "picketing" cases,4 the Supreme Court weighed the values of permitting
unrestricted freedom of expression in organizing and furthering labor unionism
against the coercive threat presented by unrestricted picketing. In the "leaflet"
cases,s the value of free expression was held to override the danger of littered
streets; and in the "meeting" cases,' 6 the value of free expression was given a
greater weight than any difficulties of policing. 7
The California Supreme Court in the present case, by invoking the clear and
present danger test, is not only accepting but apparently extending this doctrine
to all cases involving freedom of expression. The question presented to the
court was not one of punishnient under a penal statute, but whether the state,
having permitted the use of its public schools for meetings, must grant such use
unconditionally without subjecting the applicants to some measure of responsibility.
The technique of balancing social values in determining the constitutionality
of a restriction upon freedom of expression involves a process similar to that
employed by the courts in considering legislation under the state's police power.
And inasmuch as the statute in this case is not penal in nature, it would seem
that in this phase of civil liberties the statute should stand or fall on the same
basis as those statutes enacted under the police power of a state.'8
On the other hand, this extension of the clear and present danger doctrine to
a non-penal statute may be justified if it eliminates a previous restraint. Stat13 In the Pennekamp case, Mr. Justice Reed, speaking for the majority, said, ".... we
must weigh the impact of the words against the protection given by the principles of the
First Amendment ....
to public comment on pending court cases. We conclude that the
danger .... has not the clearness and immediacy necessary to close the door of permissible
public comment." 66 S. Ct. 1029, io39 (1946). Note that Mr. Justice Frankfurter limits the
application of the clear and present danger test to the specifically alleged danger in this case,
thus avoiding any reference to a national danger. See also Cathcart, Constitutional Freedom
of Speech and of the Press, 21 A.B.A.J. 595 (i935).
-4 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (i94o); American Federation of Labor v.- Swing,
312 U.S. 321 (1941).

'sLovellv. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Schneiderv. State, 308 U.S.

147 (1940).
16 DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (I939); Cox v.
New Hampshire, 32 U.S. 569 (1941).
'7 But in the "flag-salute" cases, freedom of expression was subordinated to the state's
policy of encouraging national unity until the United States Supreme Court reversed itself
in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1934). Six "flag-salute"
cases were decided by the Supreme Court within a span of six years. The first five cases upheld
the state's power to require flag saluting. Leoles v. Landers, 3o2 U.S. 656 (9.37); Hering v.
State Board of Education, 303 U.S. 624 (1938); Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 3o6 U.S. 621
(1939); Johnson v. Deerfield, 3o6 U.S. 621 (1939); Minersville District v. Gobitis, 3io U.S.
586 (i94o). However in the Barnette case, the clear and present danger doctrine was invoked
and the state statute was invalidated. But it should be noted that only in this latter case was
the statute penal in nature.
is For a striking illustration of a parallel situation where this approach was utilized, see
People v. Sandstrom, 279 N.Y. 523, iS N.E. 2d 84o (I939).

RECENT CASES

utes requiring the fulfillment of conditions precedent to the exercise of free
speech can operate as effectively to restrain an individual as would a penal statute. Where this is the situation, such statutes should, logically, also be invalidated. Consequently, the court in the Danskincase might well be serving notice
that it will not tolerate any limitation whatsoever upon freedom of expression
by a statute calculated to circumvent the judicial test applicable to penal statutes, where the statute in question operates with equal effectiveness to inhibit
the freedom of expression. A general adoption of this view would operate to extend the clear and present danger test to all instances where the legislature seeks
to regulate freedom of expression, an extension which has been urged by various
writers.!9 It has also been suggested that states should actively encourage freedom of expression as a necessary prerequisite for an enlightened society.20 In
many communities the achievement of such a goal is necessarily dependent upon
the acquisition of a meeting-place usually under the control of a public agency.
Certainly the California Supreme Court, in requiring that where public auditoriums are to be used for meetings they must be made available without prior
restraints, is clearing the way for a greater freedom of expression.
Income Taxation-Dividend-on Purchases-Dividends from Capitalized
Earnings Taxable to One becoming Stockholder after Capitalization-[Federal].
-Between
i916, when it was organized, and 1932, a corporation had sold 8,840
shares of $ioo par value common stock at $ioo per share. Between 192r and
1924, corporate earnings were capitalized through the distribution of non-taxable
common stock dividends. In 193 2, by a reduction of par value from $ioo to $25,
the capital stock account was written down and a capital surplus was created.
Subsequent earnings were carried in an earned surplus account. In 1939 a cash
dividend of $9 per share was distributed; $o.4489 of this was debited to earned
surplus (thereby exhausting the earned surplus account) and $8.5511 was debited to the capital surplus account. Plaintiff, an officer of the corporation, who
bad purchased 12,120 of 23,417 outstanding shares at an aggregate cost of $2o6,845 between 1931 and 1939, treated that part of the dividend which had been

debited to capital surplus as a return of capital and reported only the $0.4489
per share as a taxable dividend. The commissioner determined that the entire
distribution was a taxable dividend since the source of the capital surplus created by the par value reduction was the undistributed earnings which had been
capitalized upon the issuance of the previous stock dividends. The Tax Court
upheld the commissioner. On petition of review to the circuit court, held, the
previous non-taxable stock dividends had not changed earnings to capital, and
the fact that the plaintiff was not a distributee of such a dividend but a pur19Chafee, Freedom of Speech (r920). For a discussion of related problems see Corwin,
Freedom of Speech and Press under the First Amendment: a R~sum6, 30 Yale L. J. 48 (1920);
Willis, Freedom of Speech and of the Press, 4 Ind. L. J. 445 (1929).
20 Reisman, Civil Liberties in a Period of Transition 88 (1942).

